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Dissolution of Marriage and the Bankruptcy
Act of 1973: "Fresh Start" Forgotten
The proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973,1 if enacted, will completely
revise both the substantive provisions of the bankruptcy law and the
structure of the bankruptcy courts. As with most major legislation, the
proposed Act has drawn a great deal of attention.2 While most of the
attention has centered on the major revisions of the Act, this note will focus
on a relatively minor, but potentially far-reaching, revision which provides
a new and broadened discharge exception for debtor obligations arising
from marital separations or dissolutions.3
In analyzing the revised marital discharge exception, this note will first
discuss the marital discharge provision of the present bankruptcy law and
its effect on the status of economic awards arising from marital separations
or dissolutions. This discussion will illustrate how the tensions which
inevitably arise between conflicting policy considerations are resolved
under current bankruptcy law. In discussing the resolution of conflicting
policy considerations, the note will attempt to provide some insight into
'In 1970 a Bankruptcy Commission was created on the recommendation of the Judiciary
Committee of the Senate to study and recommend changes in the Bankruptcy Act. Act of July
24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468. The Commission's recommendations appear in
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No.
93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT]. The first part of
the COMMISSION REPORT consists of discussions of the proposed changes, and the second part
consists of the text of proposed changes. The proposed act is hereinafter cited as the Act of
1973.
2See, e.g., Seidman, The Present Status of the Proposed Bankruptcy Acts, 80 CoM. L.J.
475 (1975); Twinen, Bankruptcy Report: Some Limitations on Creditors' Rights, 29 Bus. LAW.
353 (1974); Viles, Non-Revolutionary Bankruptcy Act Proposed by the National Bankruptcy
Commission, 29 Bus. LAW. 1117 (1974). See also Lee, A Critical Comparison of the
Commission Bill and the Judges' Bill for the Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 49 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 1, 26 (1975).
'The federal statute concerning dischargeable obligations presently provides:
A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable
debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as ... (7) are for alimony
due or to become due, or for maintenance or support of wife or child ...
Bankruptcy Act § 17a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(7) (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Bankruptcy
Act].
Under present bankruptcy law, obligations that are essentially for maintenance or
support of the debtor's dependents are not discharged in bankruptcy, while obligations that
are asset divisions are discharged. See, e.g., Nichols v. Hensler, 528 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1976);
Merriman v. Hawbaker, 5 F. Supp. 432 (E.D. Ill. 1934); Remondino v. Remondino, 41 Cal.
App. 2d 208, 106 P.2d 437 (Dist. Ct. App. 1940).
The proposed Act of 1973 provides, however, that:
[A] discharge extinguishes all debts of an individual debtor, whether or not
allowable, except . . . (6) any liability to a spouse or child for maintenance or
support, for alimony due or to become due, or under a property settlement in
connection with a separation agreement or divorce decree. . ..
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, § 4-506(a)(6).
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the process by which bankruptcy courts presently distinguish maintenance
and support obligations from asset divisions for the purpose of determin-
ing the dischargeability of the obligations.4 The discussion will then turn
'Although bankruptcy courts are most frequently called upon to make this distinction,
all courts are called upon to give effect to the law in various procedural contexts. For example,
Nichols v. Hensler, 528 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1976), arose under diversity jurisdiction in the
context of creditor supplementary proceedings brought in district court by a bankrupt's
spouse to enforce a judgment on the marital obligation. The debtor raised his bankruptcy
discharge in defense. Thus, the Seventh Circuit ruled on the husband's motion to dismiss the
wife's petition seeking supplementary proceedings, thereby giving effect to the husband's
prior discharge. Therefore, although a bankruptcy court may grant a debtor a discharge of
"all dischargeable debts," other courts may be called upon to decide how the discharge effects
the particular issues before them.
The maintenance and division of assets distinction has ramifications that extend
beyond the area of bankruptcy. The trial court's classification of the economic award either as
for maintenance or as a division of the parties' assets is also significant at the state level. That
is, if the trial court determines that the economic award is the latter, then the economic award
is not modifiable irrespective of changes in the circumstances of the parties. Therefore, an
obligee party who received a fixed sum of assets spread out over a period of time would be
precluded from having his or her need reevaluated by the trial court even though the obligee
party might have subsequently become disabled. By the same token, events might have made
the obligee party less dependent upon the payments and, on the other hand, the financial
burdens of the obligor party might have increased.
The second ramification of the classification of the economic award at the state level
relates to enforceability, i.e., economic awards representing a division of assets are viewed
simply as debts, and therefore the obligor party cannot be found in civil contempt for failure
to pay. Conversely, economic awards representing maintenance carry with them the threat of
a civil citation, possibly resulting in a jail sentence for failure to pay. Finally, whether or not
the economic award constitutes maintenance will determine deductibility for income tax
purposes. If the economic award is determined to be maintenance the obligor party is allowed
to deduct the payments from his income resulting in a lower tax. See Note, Indiana's
Alimony Confusion, 45 IND. L.J. 595, 600 (1970), for discussion of the burdens and benefits
regarding deductibility. Note, however, that in order to be deductible under the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, the payments must be periodic and that "periodic" is a term of art:
Payments are periodic only if they are made after the decree or written agreement,
thus they cannot be retroactive or prepaid. Payments are installment rather than
periodic if the principal sum is specified in the decree instrument or agreement.
However, if those installment payments are payable over a period of more than ten
(10) years, from the date of the decree or agreement, they may qualify as periodic.
Installment payments for less than ten (10) years may be deemed periodic if
payment of a specified lump sum is made contingent upon a current or later event.
For example, if the husband is to pay alimony to his ex-wife for six (6) years
subsequent to the date of the decree unless she dies or remarries. (Baker vs.
Commissioner, 205 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1953) Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(3) adopts the Baker
ruling, and provides in part that payments made over a period of ten (10) years or
less which are subject to one or more of the contingencies of death of either spouse,
remarriage of the wife or change in the economic status of either spouse, are not
installment payments; therefore, they are periodic payments includable in the wife's
income under Section 71 and deductible by the husband under Section 215. This is
the result whether those contingencies are cited in the written instrument or
imposed by local law.
If the total amount to be paid is not specified or cannot be readily ascertained
from the decree or written agreement, the payments will be deemed periodic. The
contingency rule applies if the total amount is not set but can be determined. Such
payments are deemed periodic if the installments may be cut off by contingent
events such as death.
[Vol. 52:469
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to an analysis of the proposedAct's revised marital discharge exception which
purports to abolish the significance of the distinction between asset divisions
and maintenance and support obligations.5 Specifically, the note will
examine the effect of the revised marital discharge exception in favoring the
economic interests of the non-bankrupt spouse over the current bankruptcy
law's approach of balancing the non-bankrupt spouse's economic interests
with the bankrupt's "fresh start.' 6 Finally, the note will argue that the
revised marital discharge exception constitutes an unnecessary infringe-
ment on the bankrupt's fresh start.
THE MARITAL DISCHARGE EXCEPTION: SECTION 17(a)(7)
Bankruptcy Discharge
The primary purpose of the bankruptcy discharge is to relieve the
debtor from a financially unproductive life and to give him a fresh start in
the management of his financial affairs.7 As Justice Sutherland observed in
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt:8
One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to "relieve the
honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him
to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent
upon business misfortunes." This purpose of the act has been again and
again emphasized by the courts as being of public as well as private
interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who
surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the time of
bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt. The
various provisions of the bankruptcy act were adopted in the light of that
view and are to be construed when reasonably possible in harmony with it
so as to effectuate the general purpose and policy of the act.9
The bankruptcy discharge, however, is not absolute. There are many
situations where competing policy considerations outweigh the debtor's
Rucker, Tax Implications of Dissolution of Marriage, in FAMILY LAW PIaxnCE MANUAL, Part
III, at 3-4 (1974). See I.R.C. §§ 71(a), 215.
5See notes 60-80 infra & text accompanying.
6See notes 81-84 infra & text accompanying.
1 7See Hartman, The Dischargeability of Debts in Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 13, 14(1961).
It is generally agreed that the primary purpose of personal bankruptcy law is to give the
debtor a "fresh start" in his financial affairs. See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971);
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); Williams v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.,
236 U.S. 549 (1915); In re Rinker, 107 F. Supp. 261 (D.N.M. 1952).
This note argues that the language of section 4-506(a)(6) of the Act of 1973, impairs the
debtor's "fresh start" rights. Note, however, that the Commission's recommendations, taken
as a whole, are considered by some to be weighted too much in the debtor's favor. See
Twinen, Bankruptcy Report: Some Limitations on Creditors' Rights, 29 Bus. LAW. 353 (1974).
8292 U.S. 234 (1934).
91d. at 244 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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need for a "fresh start."' 0  Those situations require that the obligations
involved be protected from the bankrupt's general discharge.
Under the original Bankruptcy Act the debtor was given no release
from his previously contracted debts." Although his assets were divided
ratably among his creditors, any property rights subsequently acquired by
the bankrupt vested immediately in all of his creditors, both old and new.' 2
It was not until the second Bankruptcy Act was passed in 1841 that a
discharge actually released the bankrupt from his debts. 13 Even then,
however, the discharge did not signal a complete termination of the
bankrupt's obligations. Several types of obligations which created com-
peting policy considerations were excepted. 4 This scheme of a general
discharge with specific exceptions has survived subsequent amendments to
the Bankruptcy Act and forms the basis of the current law's discharge
provision.' 5 Section 17 of the current Bankruptcy Act discharges only
provable 6 obligations and then only those provable obligations not
specifically excepted."
The marital discharge exception is one example of those obligations
which are not discharged in bankruptcy.' Section 17 specifically provides
'For example, the policy against fraud and deceit embodied in section 17(a) of the
Bankruptcy Act prohibits the discharge of debts which (a) were created by the debtor's "fraud,
embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary
capacity"; (b) were "due for moneys of an employee received or retained by his employer to
secure the faithful performance by such employee of the terms of a contract of employment";
or (c) were "liabilities for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another
other than conversion." Thus, the policy favoring the bankrupt's fresh start is balanced
against competing policies. See Bankruptcy Act § 17a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(7) (1970).
"See Hartman, The Dischargeability of Debts in Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 13, 14
(1961).
'
21d.
1d.
14See note 10 supra.
'-See note 3 supra.
'6Section 63 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1970), defines a provable claim:
(a) Debts of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his estate which are
founded upon (1) a fixed liability, as evidenced by a judgment or an instrument in
writing, absolutely owing at the time of the filing of the petition ... and before
consideration of the bankrupt's application for a discharge... ; (8) contingent debts
and contingent contractual liabilities ...
Part of the rationale for the nondischargeability of claims that were not provable at the filing
of bankruptcy appears to be that if the creditors of the bankrupt have not been able to reduce
their claims to a fixed liability, it has been impossible for them to receive an opportunity to
share in the distribution of the bankrupt's estate, and it is only fair that they should retain the
rights to their claims.
Consequently, even awards that are clearly and exclusively asset divisions, if non-
provable, i.e., not susceptible to a definite figure of liability at the time of filing, are also
nondischargeable.
7 Bankruptcy Act § 17a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(7) (1970). See also Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190
U.S. 340 (1903). Thus, under present law, even though a maintenance or support provision is
provable it is not subject to discharge.
18See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,
244 (1934); Williams v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549 (1915); In re Rinker, 107
[Vol. 52:469
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that obligations are not dischargeable if they "are for alimony due or to
become due, or for maintenance or support of wife or child. . .."19
Although this language was added in 190320 by an amendment to the
Bankruptcy Act, the courts had long been achieving the same result by
treating maintenance and support obligations as nonprovable and therefore
nondischargeable debts. 2' Clearly, both the legislative and judicial views of
this exception indicate that the non-bankrupt spouse's need for continued
maintenance and support outweighs the bankrupt's need for a fresh start.22
The tension between these competing policies, one protecting the
spouse's interest in continued maintenance and support and the other
protecting the bankrupt's fresh start, was not eliminated, however, by the
enactment of the marital discharge exception contained in section 17.
Instead, the tension was heightened by the requirement that courts
distinguish maintenance and support obligations, which are not discharge-
able, from asset divisions, which are dischargeable. 23 At least implicitly,
this requisite distinction forced the courts to indicate the extent to which
the policy favoring protection of the spouse's economic interests was to be
favored over the policy of providing the bankrupt with a fresh financial
start. The case law which has ensued has shown that the courts have met
their obligation and have developed standards which adequately balance
and safeguard both policy considerations.
The Current Approach to the Marital Discharge Exception
The federal policy underlying the marital discharge exception of
bankruptcy law assures the maintenance and support of the non-bankrupt
spouse. In order to effectuate the federal policy, the courts have devised
certain general standards for distinguishing between an obligation for
maintenance or support and an obligation that represents a division of the
parties' assets. The broadcast of these standards was articulated in the case of
Remondino v. Remondino:24
F. Supp. 261 (D.N.M. 1952). See generally Joslin, Bankruptcy from a Family Law Perspective,
9 VAND. L. REV. 789 (1956); Note, California Divorce Agreements-Alimony or Property
Settlement?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 781 (1950).
1911 U.S.C. § 85(a)(7) (1970).20See Act of Feb. 5, 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-62, ch. 487, § 17, 32 Stat. 798 (amending
Bankruptcy Act § 17a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(7) (1970)). See also 1A COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY IT 17
(14th ed. 1956); 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 19 (14th ed. 1956).
21See, e.g., Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904); Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340
(1903).22See notes 27-47 infra & text accompanying.
23See, e.g., Nichols v. Hensler, 528 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1976); Merriman v. Hawbaker, 5 F.
Supp. 432 (E.D. Il1. 1934); Remondino v. Remondino, 41 Cal. App. 2d 208, 106 P.2d 437 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1940).
2141 Cal. App. 2d 208, 106 P.2d 437 (Dist. Ct. App. 1940).
1977)
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If, upon a consideration of the entire transaction the court determines
that the purpose [of the economic award at the time of the dissolution or
separation] is to guarantee the economic safety of the [obligee party] by
the [obligor party], then his discharge does not effect his liability under
the judgment.25
In Remondino, the court rejected the bankrupt's contention that the
obligation embodied in the dissolution of marriage decree amounted to a
dischargeable contract obligation between the bankrupt and his spouse.
Rather, recognizing that a substantial part of the economic award pursuant
to the dissolution decree would be used for the purpose of spousal support,
the court held that the obligation under the dissolution decree represented
unpaid maintenance and was therefore nondischargeable.2 6
Consistent with looking to the underlying nature of the entire
agreement, the general rule where sections of a party agreement appear to
seek a final and complete settlement of the parties' interests in their
property is that the agreement will probably be interpreted by the courts as
representing an asset division. 27
Within this general framework, the courts have formulated other
standards, which, although not conclusive, 28 are persuasive29 in delineating
asset divisions from awards of maintenance or support. First, if the
payments are to continue irrespective of the death or remarriage of the non-
bankrupt spouse, the payments will likely be treated as asset divisions.30 On
the other hand, if the payments are specifically to terminate upon the death
or remarriage of the non-bankrupt spouse, the reverse presumption is
true.3t Second, if the amount or continuance of the payments is made
251d. at 214, 106 P.2d at 441 (citing In re Ridder 79 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1935)).
261d.
27Cf. Branca, Dischargeability of Financial Obligations in Divorce: The Support
Obligation and the Division of Marital Property, 9 FAM. L.Q. 405, 414 (1975). See also Note,
The Economics of Divorce: Alimony and Property Awards, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 133, 135 (1974).
28Cf. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMEsTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 14.8 (1968). In
referring to the determinations that follow the application of these judicially formulated
standards, it is made clear that while both asset divisions and maintenance will "ordinarily"
or "generally" have certain distinct characteristics, in the final analysis it is the substance of
the agreement that is determinant rather than form.29 d. See Branca, Dischargeability of Financial Obligations in Divorce: The Support
Obligation and the Division of Marital Property, 9 FAM. L.Q. 405, 415 (1975).
301n cases where the agreement or order does not provide that periodic payments
are to stop in the event of death or remarriage of the wife, it is likely that
the court will conclude that such payments are in satisfaction of a property
settlement and do not create a liability for support of the [non-bankrupt spouse].
Loiseaux, Domestic Obligations in Bankruptcy, 37 REF. J. 68, 70 (1963). See, e.g., Tropp v.
Tropp, 129 Cal. App. 62, 18 P.2d 385 (Dist. Ct. App. 1933) (annual payments unaffected by the
remarriage were held to represent dischargeable asset divisions).
S31The courts have established another rule of thumb which is not conclusive,
but which aids in distinguishing alimony from a property division: that ordinarily
an obligation for alimony will terminate upon death or remarriage of the wife. In
fact, one writer has concluded that the essential element [in determining] support is
[Vol. 52:469
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contingent upon the future earning ability of the parties, the payments will
probably be characterized as maintenance or support.3 2 Third, if the
payments are to be made in gross, as opposed to periodic installments over
long periods of time, they will likely be deemed asset divisions.33 Finally, if
payment of the obligations embodied in the dissolution or separation
decree is primarily designed as the method for the non-bankrupt spouse to
pay, "for example, for medical care, educaion, the balance on car install-
ments or the mortgage on the home, the payments will generally be
characterized as for maintenance or support.34
It should be emphasized that the aforementioned circumstances are only
persuasive factors that a court might consider rather than absolute
determinants of the eventual characterization of the obligation in bank-
ruptcy. For example, payments representing asset divisions may in fact be
a continuing obligation on the husband which will terminate either when the need
ends or when the duty is assumed by another. In those cases where the terms of a
settlement or decree do not provide for termination on death or remarriage, the
court will usually find this to be a property settlement with the result that the
obligation is a provable claim which may be discharged in bankruptcy. If the
settlement or decree expressly provides that the liability will not be affected by death
or remarriage, it is quite certain that the court will find the arrangement to be a
property settlement.
Branca, Dischargeability of Financial Obligations in Divorce: The Support Obligation and
the Division of Marital Property, 9 FAM. L.Q. 405, 416 (1975) (quoting Loiseaux, Domestic
Obligations in Bankruptcy, 37 REF. J. 68, 71 (1963)) (citations omitted); Cf. COWANS, BANK-
RUPTCY LAW-AND PRacICE § 460 (1973 Supp.).
s2See, e.g., Nichols v. Hensler, 528 F.2d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 1976) (case remanded to lower
court for a determination whether the economic award was intended to be an asset division or
based on the incomes of the parties, in which case it would be viewed as nondischargeable
maintenance).
-"Cf. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 14.8 (1968),
stating that asset divisions are "usually . . . payable . . by a single payment or transfer
. .(emphasis added).
"4See notes-76-78 infra & text accompanying. In this regard, it has been noted that
[i]f... a husband and wife execute an agreement which provides that the
husband will purchase a house for the wife to live in and that he will also pay
certain monthly payments, the obligation to purchase the house is part of the
husband's obligation to support his wife and therefore unaffected by any subsequent
bankruptcy of the husband. Furthermore, the liability of a bankrupt husband to
make mortgage payments on a residence which his wife occupies is nondischarge-
able.
Loiseaux, Domestic Obligations in Bankruptcy, 37 REF. J. 68, 72 (1963).
35A factor which complicates the determination is that a court may award
either alimony or a division of property in the form of periodic .payments, and a
single document may contain both types of periodic payments.
Branca, Dischargeability of Financial Obligations in Divorce: The Support Obligation and
the Division of Marital Property, 9 FAM. L.Q. 405, 416 (1975).
Note that the Supreme Court has expressed some concern that earning ability does not
become a factor in asset divisions:
The earning power of an individual is the power to create property; but it is
not translated into property within the meaning of the bankruptcy act until it has
brought earnings into existence.
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 243 (1934). This language indicates that the concept of
19771
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spread out over long periods of time,35 and payments representing
maintenance or support may be paid in a lump-sum 3 6 or made noncon-
tingent upon death or remarriage.3 7  Indeed, in some cases the exact
conditions of the party agreements may be equivocal or not truly consistent
with either an award of maintenance or support or a division of the parties'
assets.38 In those cases, the courts will either sever those payments within
the agreements themselves representing maintenance or support from those
payments representing asset divisions39 or, alternatively, the courts will
consider the essential purpose of the entire set of transactions.
40
The Application of the Marital Discharge Exception
Underlying the application of the marital discharge exception of the
Bankruptcy Act are two competing policy considerations: (1) the concern
that the debtor's rehabilitative chances be viable4' and (2) the concern that
the non-bankrupt spouse's maintenance or support needs be met. 42 The
earning ability is distinct from the concept of assets. The negative implication is that until
earning ability is translated into assets, it remains exclusively an element of support.
On the other hand, when courts decree asset divisions based on the earning ability, they
may not necessarily be inconsistent with the policy against allowing earning ability to figure
in the asset division if viewed as merely executory asset divisions.36Swann, Dischargeability of Domestic Obligations in Bankruptcy, 43 TENN. L. REv.
231, 233 (1976). Cf. H. CLARK, LAW OF DoMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 14.8
(1968); Branca, Dischargeability of Financial Obligations in Divorce: The Support Obligation
and the Division of Marital Property, 9 FAM. L.Q. 405, 416 (1975).37See, e.g., Sloan v. Mitchell, 28 Cal. App. 3d 47, 104 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1972), where the
agreement to make payments irrespective of the remarriage of the non-bankrupt spouse was
held to constitute "alimony."
3SA borderline case can result when the court issues a general dissolution decree,
incorporating a perfunctorily drafted party agreement without sufficient scrutiny. For
example, such an incorporated agreement may simply provide that, upon dissolution of the
marriage, one half of the total assets is to go to the wife and the other half to the husband "in
lieu of all other claims" between the two. Thus, since the assets will invariably be in various
degrees of liquidity, it will be up to the bankruptcy court to determine which portions
constitute nondischargeable maintenance, and vice versa.
39E.g., Avery v. Avery, 114 F.2d 768 (6th Cir. 1940), where it was held that the master
appointed by the bankruptcy court properly inquired into the judgment to determine what
portions represented payments of maintenance and what portions represented a release of
dower and property rights.
4
°Cf. Remondino v. Remondino, 41 Cal. App. 2d 208, 214, 106 P.2d 437, 441 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1940) (citing In re Ridder, 79 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1935)).4 iSee Hartman, The Dischargeability of Debts in Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 13, 14
(1961). See, e.g., Nichols v. Hensler, 528 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1976); Merriman v. Hawbaker, 5 F.
Supp. 432 (E.D. Ill. 1934); Remondino v. Remondino, 41 Cal. App. 2d 208, 106 P.2d 437 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1940).42Williams v. Department of Social 9c Health Serv., 529 F.2d 1264, 1264-69 (9th Cir.
1976) ("obligations to dependents are beyond [the Bankruptcy Act's] remedial purposes").
The Court in Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904), declared:
[U]nless positively required by direct enactment the courts should not presume a
design upon the part of Congress in relieving the unfortunate debtor to make the
law a means of avoiding enforcement of the obligation, moral and legal, devolved
upon the husband to support his wife .... [Slo far as . . . support is concerned,
[Vol. 52:469
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Supreme Court has noted that any interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act
must be tempered by the intent of Congress "to leave the bankrupt free after
the date of his petition to accumulate new wealth in the future" and thus
be able to make an unencumbered fresh start.4 3 In practice, however, courts
have understandably favored findings involving maintenance and support,
especially where the rights and responsibilities of family relationships are
involved." In the recent case of Williams v. Department of Social & Health
Services,45 for example, the court adopted a rather elastic definition of
maintenance or support in order to prevent the discharge of a debtor's
familial obligation. In Williams, the debtor had not abided by a court
decree rendered in connection with his marriage dissolution which
required him to make monthly payments in support of his minor children.
As a consequence, the Department provided the mother with public
assistance toward the children's support. The debtor thereafter filed for
bankruptcy, and in a later action by the Department to recover the monies
paid, the bankrupt claimed that any obligation to repay the Department
had been discharged in bankruptcy.4 6 In rejecting this contention, the
court stated that the recoupment from the bankrupt of public assistance
money provided for the support of his dependent children is essentially an
obligation for "maintenance or support" and falls within the bankruptcy
law's marital discharge exception. 47
One of the more significant developments in the application of the
marital discharge exception of the Bankruptcy Act has been the treatment
of prior state law decisions regarding the nature of the obligation. When
faced with the quesiton of giving effect to the discharge of a debtor from an
obligation incurred under a dissolution of marriage, courts generally deny
effect to the classification of the economic award under state law.48 Rather,
they apply standards from bankruptcy law to determine maintenance
obligations, which are nondischargeable, and obligations that represent a
division of the parties' assets, which are dischargeable. 49 This denial of
effect may be important because some states have very liberal maintenance
laws, 0 while other states have just the reverse.5' Thus, giving great weight
looking beneath the judgment for the foundation upon which it rests we find it was
... only a means designed by the law for carrying into effect and making available
to the wife . . . the right which the law gives them as against the husband ....
Id. at 77.
4
sSegal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966).
4See, e.g., Poolman v. Poolman, 289 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1961); Erickson v. Beardall, 20
Utah 2d 287, 437 P.2d 210 (1968); Lyon v. Lyon, 115 Utah 466, 206 P.2d 148 (1949).
45529 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1976).
16d. at 1266.
47d. at 1272.
"gSee Loiseaux, Domestic Obligations in Bankruptcy, 37 REF. J. 68, 70 (1963).
49d. at 69.
5OSee, e.g., ILL REv. STAT. ch. 40, § 19 (1976 Supp.) ("the court may . . . order .
alimony and maintenance ... as ... shall be fit, reasonable and just .. "); KAN STAT. § 60-
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to the various state court classifications would not only operate to frustrate
the debtor's fresh start or his spouse's maintenance goals where genuinely
warranted,52 but would also serve to destroy whatever uniformity was
intended in the application of the marital discharge provision. Nichols v.
Hensler 3 illustrates the typical problem. Nichols involved the interpre-
tation of a separation agreement made by the husband and wife and
incorporated by an Indiana court into the dissolution decree. The dispute
arose when the husband, resisting the wife's attempt to enforce the
agreement, set up as a defense his discharge in a previous bankruptcy
proceeding. Under the terms of the agreement, certain monthly install-
ments owed to the wife were payments of "alimony." 54  Alimony in
Indiana at the time of the agreement constituted a division of the parties'
assets,5 5 and thus was subject to discharge under the Bankruptcy Act. The
1610(c) (1975 Supp.) (alimony may be awarded in such amount as the court shall find to be
fair, just and equitable under all of the circumstances); MICH. ComP. LAWS § 552.13 (1975
Supp.) (the court "may require either party ... to pay such sums as shall be deemed proper
and necessary..."); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:34-23 (West 1975) ("the court may make such order
... as the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall render fit . . .").5
'Compare those statutes in Illinois, Kansas and Michigan set forth in note 50 supra,
with, for example, the more restrictive wording of Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.200 (1975 Supp.)
("court may grant a maintenance order ... only if ... the spouse seeking maintenance: (a)
[flacks sufficient property . . . to provide for his reasonable needs; and (b) [i]s unable to
support himself through appropriate employment . . ."), and IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-9(c)(1975) ("[t]he court may make no provision for maintenance except that when the court finds a
spouse to be physically or mentally incapacitated to the extent that the ability of such
incapacitated spouse to support himself or herself is materially affected ... ").
The effect of these contrasting laws inevitably leads to a finding of maintenance in one
state in a case where an asset division would be found in another, and vice versa.52For example, in Temple v. Temple, - Ind. App. - , 328 N.E.2d 227 (1975), the
Indiana Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision denying maintenance to the wife
who was afflicted with grand mal epilepsy. In another Indiana case, Liszkai v. Liszkai, -
Ind. App. - , 343 N.E.2d 799 (1976), the trial court's rejection of a wife's claim for
maintenance was also approved. The court held that a poorly educated middle-aged woman
with few marketable skills is not incapacitated.
53528 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1976).
541d. at 306.
5uBefore passage of the Dissolution of Marriage Act, INn CODE § 31-1-11.5-1 et seq. (1975
Supp.), a majority of the Indiana appellate courts considered any economic award rendered at
the time of the dissolution of marriage solely as a present and complete division of the
economic assets or property rights of the parties. See, e.g., Doner v. Doner, - Ind. App.
- , 302 N.E.2d 511 (1973); Sidebottom v. Sidebottom, 140 Ind. App. 657, 225 N.E.2d 772
(1967); Smith v. Smith, 131 Ind. App. 38, 169 N.E.2d 130 (1960); Shula v. Shula, 235 Ind. 210, 132
N.E.2d 612 (1956). Oddly enough, this division of assets was termed an award of "alimony," a
word generally thought of as payments to an obligee party for support or maintenance
purposes. See Merriman v. Hawbaker, 5 F. Supp. 432, 433 (E.D. Ill. 1934). However, this
somewhat variant view prevailed despite ambiguities in the "alimony" statute that, arguably,
could have been interpreted in a way to permit the granting of maintenance awards. See Note,
Indiana's Alimony Confusion, 45 IND. L.J. 595, 599-601 (1975).
Under this view, the courts technically could not consider the future support of
the obligee party when determining the parties' respective property rights. Nonetheless, the
courts could properly consider other factors such as the "source of the property, income of the
parties and the nature of abuse inflicted upon the [obligee party], particularly if that abuse
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Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did not view the lower court's
characterization of the obligation as determinative 6 and remanded for the
purpose of determining whether the payments represented a division of the
parties' assets, in which case the husband's obligation would have been
discharged in bankruptcy, or whether the payments were based on the in-
comes of the parties, in which case the obligation would not have been dis-
charged. Thus, by looking beyond party labelling discrepancies and idiosyn-
cratic state court characterizations of the obligations owed, it is apparent that
the standards devised and applied by the courts have been fairly uniform and
effective in accommodating both the fresh start of the debtor and the
maintenance and support needs of his spouse.
THE PROPOSED DISCHARGE EXCEPTION:
SECTION 4-506(a)(6) IN PERSPECTIVE
The Bankruptcy Commission 57 was apparently concerned with thwart-
ing the devious and scheming debtor who would attempt to hold up his
discharge in bankruptcy as a defense in order to escape familial obligations.
Specifically, the Commission felt that
obligations to support family dependents in the future may take the form
of either a duty to make periodic payments based on need or an obligation
to pay a settlement based on the debtor's present or anticipated wealth.
The choice of form frequently turns on tax considerations or other factors
not directly related to the duty to provide support.5 8
There are at least two general categories of commonly encountered
circumstances that potentially threaten the policy of assuring maintenance
affected the earning capacity of the [obligee party] and would have been the basis for an
action in damages except for the fact of marriage." Shula v. Shula, 235 Ind. 210, 214-15, 132
N.E.2d 612, 614 (1956).
The effect of considering such factors in the overall determination of property rights
inevitably prompted some courts to award considerably more liberal awards than would have
been allowable under a strict "division of assets" interpretation, thereby enhancing the
opportunity for a needy spouse to apply the economic award toward his or her actual
maintenance. See Farley v. Farley, - Ind. App. -, 300 N.E.2d 375 (1973), where the trial
court was held not to have abused its discretion by requiring the husband to pay $6,500 in suit
money on behalf of the wife who had already received $87,500 as a result of a property
settlement in which the husband received property valued at $162,500. In Draime v. Draime,
132 Ind. App. 99, 173 N.E.2d 70 (1961), the court's grant of the business and all the personal
property located therein to the wife and of $5,000 to the husband was upheld within its broad
discretionary powers to adjust and adjudicate the property rights of the parties.
In any case, past decisions of Indiana courts failed to provide a clear distinction between
economic awards that were for "maintenance" and divisions of assets; rather, there was an
intermingling of the two concepts under the common label of "alimony" which was treated as
a division of assets. In order not to exascerbate the problem, what is generally thought to be
alimony will be, whenever possible, referred to as maintenance or support.
56Nichols v. Hensler, 528 F.2d 304, 307 n.1 (7th Cir. 1976).
57See note 1 supra.
58COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 139 (emphasis added).
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or support for the non-bankrupt spouse in bankruptcy. These include
situations where (a) contemplating bankruptcy and its collateral discharge
benefits, the parties have mislabelled provisions of the agreement actually
intended as maintenance, making them appear to be a division of assets, or
such a mislabelling has occurred inadvertently; or (b) miscalculating the
non-bankrupt spouse's maintenance or support requirements, an errone-
ously high proportionate share of the total assets has been included in the
asset division. As a response to these perceived threats, the Commission
proposed section 4-506:
A discharge extinguishes all debts of an individual debtor, whether or not
allowable, except... (6) any liability to a spouse or child for maintenance
or support, for alimony due or to become due, or under a property
settlement in connection with a separation agreement or [dissolution of
marriage] decree3 9
This language broadens the marital discharge exception by, presumably,
treating all property settlements in connection with a separation or
dissolution decree as nondischargeable maintenance. The effect of this
change, arguably, detracts from the policy of giving the debtor an
opportunity for a fresh start.
Section 4-506 and Third Party Creditors
The effect of section 4-506 would be keenly felt with respect to third
party creditors. In interpreting the current discharge provision, the courts
indicated very early that not all obligations incurred for the benefit of the
debtor's dependents are nondischargeable. 6 Rather, obligations to third
party creditors are treated specially and are generally discharged in
bankruptcy.61 Schellenberg v. Mullaney62 aptly illustrates the situation. In
that case a merchant had sold clothing to the debtor for his children's use.
The merchant thereafter alleged that the debtor's subsequent discharge in
bankruptcy did not bar him from collecting this debt on the ground that
the clothing constituted "necessaries" for the debtor's children.6 3 The
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York disagreed and ruled
that the exception to discharge found in section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act
referred
59COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, § 4-506(a)(6) [Section 4-506(a)(6) will be hereinafter
referred to as section 4-506].60See, e.g., ScheIlenberg v. Mullaney, 112 App. Div. 384, 98 N.Y. Supp. 432 (1906);
Schwoll v. Meeks, 76 Ohio App. 231, 63 N.E.2d 831 (1944). See generally Loiseaux, Domestic
Obligations in Bankruptcy, 37 REF. J. 68 (1963).61Schwoll v. Meeks, 76 Ohio App. 231, 232, 63 N.E.2d 831, 832 (1944).
6212 App. Div. 385, 98 N.Y. Supp. 432 (1906).
63ld. at 384, 98 N.Y. Supp. at 432.
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only to the involuntary liability under the common law for support of wife
and children, and to any one who relieves their want; and under bonds, or
the like, given for such support by requirement of courts and magistrates.
It does not refer to liabilities for goods purchased by a husband or parent
* * . and used by wife or child. This latter fact does not change the
character of the debt.6 4
Under section 4-506, however, the result might be different. If the
debtor makes an arrangement incorporated into the separation or dissolu-
tion decree whereby he agrees to pay for "necessaries," e.g., clothing,
nourishment, medical care and education, the resultant debts incurred
could conceivably be construed as "in connection with ' 65 the particular
decree, thus becoming nondischargeable obligations.
An argument can be made that extending the exception to discharge to
include liabilities owed to these types of general creditors would reduce the
risk that the debtor will not repay and, would in turn, make such creditors
more willing to extend credit to the debtor. In the short run, this would
facilitate support of the debtor's dependents. But credit extended due to
reduced creditors' risk may be of illusory benefit to the debtor, who faces a
concomitantly increased risk of insolvency. 66  This is especially true
because these types of obligations are of the very sort that often precipitate
consumer bankruptcy.6 7 Moreover, since the debtor has already demon-
strated a proven inability to manage his financial affairs, widening the
scope of post-bankruptcy pursuit to include the claims of all professional
persons or merchants who contributed to the support of the debtor's
dependents would directly undermine his ability to start anew in his
financial affairs.
Section 4-506 and "Hold Harmless" Agreements
The area of "hold harmless" agreements is another example where
section 4-506, arguably, would retreat from the current balancing approach68
and favor the economic interests of the non-bankrupt spouse over the
bankrupt's need for a fresh start. "Hold harmless" provisions again raise
the problem of third party creditors in that they involve the formal
allocation between the parties of their obligations to such creditors.69
Suppose, for example, that H and W during the period of their marriage
have incurred certain debts in the joint operation of their business. In a
64Id.
65See note 59 supra & text accompanying.
"This is true because, while the debtor's credit limit might be rendered more flexible by
this process, his ability to pay remains constant.
67See generally COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1.
68See notes 7-10 supra & text accompanying.69See Swann, Dischargeability of Domestic Obligations in Bankruptcy, 43 TENN. L. REv.
231, 253 (1976).
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later dissolution proceeding the parties submit to the court, among other
things, an agreement that H is to hold W "harmless". on what would have
been W's pro rata share of the debt. Here again, it is entirely possible that
upon H's filing a subsequent petition in bankruptcy this agreement might
be held to be a nondischargeable obligation in connection with the dissolu-
tion decree under section 4-506.7o
The rationale behind treating "hold harmless" agreements as mainte-
nance or support is that (a) such agreements reduce the non-bankrupt
spouse's total monetary obligations and thereby increase the resources
available for that spouse's support,7' and (b) maintenance obligations may
be secreted within such agreements. 7 2 First, the rationale fails in that
almost any asset is capable of being made liquid in order to augment
maintenance. Thus, this approach, followed to its logical conclusion,
would treat all such asset divisions as maintenance, whatever their true
nature.
Second, many "hold harmless" agreements only remotely relate to
maintenance needs. Their provisions focus upon the equitable distribution
between the parties of their outstanding debts, 73 especially since mainte-
nance and support provisions have likely been inserted elsewhere in the
decree.7 4 But whatever the case may be, as previously demonstrated the
courts have been fairly successful in ferreting out and separating obliga-
tions representing maintenance from those representing asset divisions in a
particular agreement.7 5 Under the current marital discharge provision,
obligations to pay off the mortgage76 or to pay off loans secured by
furniture and other household items 77 or an automobile awarded to the
non-bankrupt spouse78 are generally held to be nondischargeable mainte-
nance obligations.
Finally, whether extending the marital discharge exception to apply, as
section 4-506 proposes, directly to third parties who contribute to main-
tenance or indirectly to third parties via "hold harmless" agreements, the
results would be the same. The third parties would reap the substantial
70See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, § 4-506.
71Swann, Dischargeability of Domestic Obligations in Bankruptcy, 43 TENN. L. REV.
231, 269 (1976).
72See note 58 supra & text accompanying.
73Cf. Swann, Dischargeability of Domestic Obligations in Bankruptcy, 43 TENN. L. REv.
231, 253 (1976).741d.
75See, e.g., Williams v. Department of Social & Health Serv., 529 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir.
1976); Nichols v. Hensler, 528 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1976); Remondino v. Remondino, 41 Cal.
App. 2d 208, 106 P.2d 437 (Dist. Ct. App. 1940); Lyon v. Lyon, 115 Utah 466, 206 P.2d 148
(1949).
76See, e.g., Poolman v. Poolman, 289 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1961); Henson v. Henson, 366
S.W.2d 1 (Mo. App. 1963).
77See, e.g., In re Baldwin, 250 F. Supp. 533 (D. Neb. 1966); Collins v. Smith, 26 Ohio
Misc. 231, 270 N.E.2d 377 (1971).
7'Collins v. Smith, 26 Ohio Misc. 231, 270 N.E.2d 377 (1971).
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benefits of nondischargeability, and the bankrupt would continue to bear
the burdens.79 This is diametrically opposed to the fresh start policy that
underlies the bankruptcy law.80 In addition, section 4-506 would have the
undesirable effect of discouraging parties from formally allocating between
themselves their obligations to third parties for fear that they might thus
become nondischargeable irrespective of their intended nature.81 Likewise,
parties would be discouraged from amicably formulating agreements
regarding the settlement of their obligations to each other.8 2 This would,
in turn, put all parties in a more precarious and -uncertain situation
whether they lie creditors or debtors.
Subsequent Developments
As stated earlier, there has been little discussion about the possible
ramifications of section 4-506. In fact, the Commission Report itself is
surprisingly devoid of any statistical evidence to support its view that
obligations representing support are presently being successfully dis-
charged in bankruptcy.83
One of the most striking indictments of the language of section 4-506
came from the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges. Reacting
adversely to the Commission Report in general8 4 and to section 4-506
specifically, the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges proposed its
own marital discharge provision.85 It provides that:
A discharge extinguishes all debts of an individual debtor, whether or
not allowable, except . . . (6) any liability to a spouse or child for
maintenance or support, or for alimony due or to become due: Provided,
however, That a debt shall not be excepted from discharge hereunder
merely to hold the spouse harmless on her obligation in any manner to
pay the debt. 8
79Cf. Schellenberg v. Mullaney, 112 App. Div. 384, 98 N.Y. Supp. 432 (1906); Schwoll v.
Meeks, 76 Ohio App. 231, 63 N.E.2d 831 (1944) (purchases for benefit of spouse and children
not excepted from discharge).
The question reduces essentially to a policy determination of which types of obligations
will survive the general discharge in bankruptcy, thereby preserving creditors' remedies to
enforce them. Bankruptcy law offers a debtor no fresh start with respect to nondischargeable
obligations.8 See notes 7-9 supra & text accompanying.
81See note 58 supra & text accompanying.
B2id.
OsSee generally COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1.84The National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges formulated and introduced its own
proposals, often referred to as the Judges' Bill for amendments to the Bankruptcy Act. National
Conference of Bankruptcy Judges' Bill, H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Judges' Bill].
S5Judges' Bill, supra note 84, at § 4-506(a)(6).
861d. (emphasis in original).
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The Judges' Bill apparently reflects a concern in favor of the
continuance of a balancing approach in this area. It does so by reaffirming
the policy toward maintenance of the non-bankrupt spouse, while at the
same time clearly limiting the extension of the marital discharge exception
to the entire category of "hold harmless" agreements.8 7 Thus, the negative
implication under this approach is that a "hold harmless" agreement will
not be held nondischargeable simply because it might supplement main-
tenance or support. Rather, it must be designed to facilitate maintenance
or support in order to be nondischargeable.
The Judges' Bill has two primary advantages over the Commission
Report. First, it deletes the broad and ambiguous "in connection with"
language of section 4-506.8 Second, it specifically limits its appli-
cability to general "hold harmless" agreements,89 which in turn increases
the chance of resolution of the dischargeability issue in a manner which
coincides with the parties' intentions.90
Despite its potentially devastating effects, there apparently remains
some support9' for the Commission's version of the marital discharge
exception. This has created the possibility of a compromise,92 but the
outcome is yet fairly uncertain. What is hoped is that the potentially far-
reaching provisions of section 4-506 will ultimately obtain the attention
they deserve, thereby preserving what was intended to be a narrow
exception to the general rule of discharge.
CONCLUSION
Under present bankruptcy law, the types of obligations that survive a
petition in bankruptcy are purposely circumscribed in order to permit the
debtor a fresh start financially. However, the debtor's plight is rightfully
viewed in conjunction with the maintenance and support needs of his
dependents, and thereby both policies are accommodated. Unfortunately,
the parties ultimately favored by section 4-506's potential extension of
nondischargeability to merchants or professionals who merely contribute to
support of the debtor's dependents or to obligations embodied in "hold
harmless" agreements are general creditors rather than the debtor's depen-
dents. On the other hand, the Judges' Bill successfully maintains the
present Act's balancing approach. In sum, any recommendations to revise
87td.
88See note 59 supra & text accompanying.89See note 86 supra & text accompanying.
9 5The parties probably have no idea that the obligations which they allocate between
themselves might thereby become nondischargeable against the very creditors from whom the
bankrupt spouse seeks relief.
9 1See Swann, Dischargeability of Domestic Obligations in Bankruptcy, 43 TENN. L. REV.
231, 269 (1976).
921d.
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the marital discharge exception of the Bankruptcy Act should reflect the
need to maintain this balance and should not be worded in such a fashion
as to automatically sweep nonmaintenance or nonsupport claims into the
nondischargeable category. Section 4-506 does not accomplish this, nor
does it do anything to increase the compatibility of the bankruptcy system
with family law concerns. In fact, if enacted unqualified, it will almost
certainly be counterproductive in both areas.
CARL D. YOUNG

